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ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND STATE WATERS.
rFHE case of Ex parte Boyer' closes with the statement that it
"does not raise the question whether the admiralty jurisdic-
tion of the district court extends to waters wholly within the
body of a state, and from which vessels cannot so pass as to carry
on commerce between places in such state and places in another state
or in a foreign country; and no opinion is intended to be intimated
as to jurisdiction in such a case." Nor does any other case appear
directly to intimate such an opinion, unless it be that of Stapp v-
Clyde2 wherein a state court decided that a federal statute giving
to district courts jurisdiction over "the navigable waters of the
United States" did not apply to navigable waters of the state wholly
unconnected navigably with those of other states, there being a
distinction between waters of a state and those of the United States.
This holding was declared without discussion or reasons given and
appears not since to have been elucidated. It is thus left an open
question whether or not the potential admiralty jurisdiction of the
Federal courts extends to such state waters.
It does not reach them by virtue merely of the fact that they are
waters; it covers only navigable waters. "All admiralty jurisdiction
refers directly or indirectly to navigation. It is the vessel and its
navigation, and the crimes, torts, and contracts growing out of it,
that form the objects of admiralty jurisdiction." 3 Indeed, prior to
1851, the jurisdiction recoginized by the courts extended only to
waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.
In England the jurisdiction had been restricted by the common
law courts to the high seas only, to that portion of the sea which
washes the open coast, exempting those waters which were "infra
corpus comitatus." As said in the case of Rex v. 49 Casks of
Brandy,4 quoting WooD's INSTITUZ, "The admiralty court has jur-
isdiction to determine all maritime causes arising wholly upon the
sea out of the jurisdiction of the county. * * * It is no part of
the sea where one may see what is done on one side of the water
and on the other."
The contention was made in this country that the admiralty jur-
isdiction of United States courts also was restricted to the high
seas and did not extend to our bays, inlets and rivei" mouths, "within
1 o9 U. S. 629, 632 (1883).
2 43 Minn. 192 (1890).
3U. S. v. Burlington & Henderson Ferry Co., 21 red. 331, 334 (1884).
43 Hagg. 283 (1836).
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the fauces terrac, even though they be tide-waters, on the ground
that the grant in the Constitution of 'all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction'" was limited to the cases which were of such
jurisdiction in England at the time the Constitution was adopted.
This claim was considered, on the question as to whether a mari-
time contract made on land is within admiralty jurisdiction, in the
case of DeLovio v. BoitP in a very lengthy opinion by Justice SToRy.
He held, p. 467:
"i. That the jurisdiction of the admiralty (in England)
until the statutes of Richard II, extended to all maritime
contracts, whether executed at home or abroad, and to all
torts, injuries and offenses on the high seas, and in ports
and havens as far as the ebb and flow of the tides.
2. That the common law interpretation of these statutes
abridges this jurisdiction to things wholly and exclusively
done upon the sea.
3. That this interpretation is indefensible on principle,
and the decisions founded on it are inconsistent and contra-
dictory.
4. That the interpretation of the same statutes by the ad-
miralty does not abridge any of its ancient jurisdiction, but
leaves to it cognizance of all maritime contracts, and all torts,
injuries and offenses, upon the high seas, and in ports as far
as the tide ebbs and flows.
5. That this is the true limit, which upon principle would
seem to belong to the admiralty * *
This extent of jurisdiction in the United States -was again de-
clared in the case of ,Varing v. Clarke.6 Here the collision out of
which suit arose occurred on the Mississippi about 95 miles above
New Orleans, so far from the sea that it was a disputed question
whether or not it was within the effect of tidal ebb and flow. The
court said, p. 451,
"It is the first time that the point has been distinctly pre-
sented to this court, whether a case of collision in our rivers,
where the tide ebbs and flows, is within the admiralty juris-
diction of the courts of the United States, if the locality be,
in the sense in which it is used by the common law judges in
England, infra corpus comitatus. It is this point that we are
now about to decide * * *. Having thus admitted to the
52 Gallison, 398, Fed. Cas. 3776 (z81S).
6 5 Hov. 441 (1847).
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fullest extent, the locality in England within which the courts
of common law permitted the admiralty to exercise jurisdic-
tion in cases of collision, we return to the ground taken that
the same limitation is to be imposed, in like cases, upon the
admiralty courts of the United States. In the first place,
those who framed the Constitution, and the lawyers in Amer-
ica in that day, were familiar with a different afid more ex-
tensive jurisdiction in most of the states, when they were
colonies, than was allowed in England * *." p. 463, "Our
conclusion is, that the admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States extends to tide waters, as far as the tide
flows, though it may be infra corpus comitatus; that the case
before us did happen where the tide ebbed and flowed infra
corpus comiictus, and that the court has jurisdiction to de-
cree upon the claim of the libellant for damages."
Thus the jurisdiction in the United States was referred back of
that known in England, and extended to all tide waters, but it was,
by the implication in the very cases so extending it, restricted, also,
to tide waters. This limitation and restriction was expressly stated
in the case of the Thos. Jefferson7 wherein the court say:
"In respect to contracts for the hire of seamen, the ad-
miralty never pretended to claim, nor could it rightfully exer-
cise, any jurisdiction, except in cases where the service was
substantially performed, or to be performed, upon the sea,
or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the tide. This is
the prescribed limit which it was not at liberty to transcend."
It was followed by the opinion in the Steamboat Orleans v. Phoe-
bus,8 to the effect that
"the case is not one of a steamboat engaged in maritime
trade or navigation. Though, in her voyages, she may have
touched, at one terminus of them, in tide waters, her employ-
ment has been, substantially, on other waters. The admiral-
ty has not any jurisdiction over vessels employed in such
voyages, in cases of disputes between part owners. The true
test of its jurisdiction in all cases of this sort is, whether the-
vessel be engaged, substantially, in maritime navigation, or
in interior navigation and trade, not on tide-waters. In the
latter case there is no jurisdiction."
7 o Wheat. 428 (1825).
s I1 Pet. 175 (1837).
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These decisions, of course, left all of our inland waters, lakes and
rivers above tide-water, whether interstate or not, outside the ad-
miralty jurisdiction. So matters stood until the decision in the case
of the Genesee Chief," in 1851. This arose out of a collision be-
tween the propeller Genesee Chief and the schooner Cuba, on Lake
Ontario. The defendants averred in answer "that the collision set
forth in the said libel occurred within the territorial boundaries of
the said state (New York), and not on the high seas, nor in any
ann of the sea, river, creek, stream or any other body of water
where the tide ebbs and flows, and therefore they say that this (ad-
miralty) court has no jurisdiction over the matters set forth in the
said libel * * *'
The court now completely overruled the earlier cases and held
the matter to be within admiralty jurisdiction. They said, p. 451,
"the conviction that this definition of admiralty powers was
narrower than the Constitution contemplated, has been grow-
ing stronger every day with the growing commerce on the
lakes and navigable rivers of the western states. * * * If
the meaning of these terms (admiralty and maritime) was
now for the first time brought before this court for consid-
eration, there could, we think, be no hesitation in saying that
the lakes and their connecting waters were embraced in them.
These lakes are in truth inland seas. Differenf states border
on them on one side and a foreign nation on the other. A
great and growing commerce is carried-on upon them be-
tween different states and a foreign nation, which is subject
to all the incidents and hazards that attend commerce on the
ocean. Hostile fleets have encountered on them, and prizes
been made; and every reason which excisted for the grant of
admiralty jurisdiction to the general government on the At-
lantic seas, applies with equal force to the lakes. (Italics
the writer's.) There is certainly nothing in the ebb and
flow of the tide that makes the waters peculiarly suitable for
admiralty jurisdiction, nor anything in the absence of a tide
that renders it (them) unfit. If it is a public navigable
water, on which commerce is carried on between different
states or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely
the same."
It has since been held to extend over all navigable waters that are
interstate, either in themselves or in their connections-even to
artificial waterways.
' x2 How. 443 (85).
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This recognition of the extended jurisdiction was based not upon
precedent, but upon the ground that there having been, until our
own fresh-water commerce grew into importance, no navigable
water except the high seas, there could be no precedent in regard to
other waters, and that the reasons for which the United States
courts were given admiralty jurisdiction, as then known, applied as
pertinently to fresh water as to salt. It was not expressly extended
to any waters except those "on which commerce is carried on be-
tween different states or nations," so that if it does extend to
other. waters it must be on the same theory-that the reasons for
giving any distinct jurisdiction to admiralty apply to such waters
as well as to the "high seas." The case itself does not discuss these
reasons, so equally applicable. What they are must be sought else-
where.
The title of "Admiral" originated, apparently, in the East, was
adopted by the Mediterranean navies and came thence to England
about the beginning of the i 4 th century.10 Even prior thereto, how-
ever, there had been courts in certain of the English sea-port towns
which particularly administered the maritime law to merchants and
sailors. "The origin of the Admiralty court can be traced with
tolerable certainty to the period between the years 134o and 1357.
It was instituted in consequence of the difficulty which had been
experienced in dealing with piracy or 'spoil' claims made by and
against foreign sovereigns. The diplomatic correspondence of the
half-century which preceded the battle of Sluys (1340) is distin-
guished by a constant stream of complaints made * * * by foreign
sovereigns against England, as to piracies and spoils committed at
sea; and as to the inability of the aggrieved persons to obtain jus-
tice. The process of our common law courts when resorted to by
foreigners appears to have entirely failed to give redress. * * *
Then (after the battle of Sluys) it was that the Admiral's court first
took something of the shape in which we find it existing at the close
of the century. Its origin was intimately connected with the claim
made by Edward III and his progenitors to be sovereigns of the
sea. * * * Its principal function was to keep the king's peace upon
the sea."-"
Because of its jurisdiction over the seas, whereof England claimed
sovereignty, other matters than piracy came within Admiralty's
purview. The law merchant was, in England, so closely related to
the common-law as to be practically a part of it, but it was "other-
" Holdsworth's Hist. of 1tnglish Law I, 313.
21 Selden Soc. Select Pleas of the Admiralty, I, xiv. Vide also, r,. P. Roscoe, Growth
of Zng. Law.
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-wise with those rules of the law merchant which applied to foreign
transactions, and with the rules of maritime law which * * * were
intimately related to this branch of the law merchant. These
branches of the law fell outside the scope of the common-law. Just
,as the borough court could not entertain cases which concerned per-
ons or matters outside the scope of its territorial jurisdiction, so
the courts of common law, after a little hesitation, declined to deal
with events which had happened or transactions which had been
,entered into abroad. Such matters * * * fell to the council of the
court of Admiralty.' 1 2 The Admiralty had power of issuing com-
missions to examine witnesses abroad and it could arrest and detain
a ship as security in an action, and by its jurisdiction over the ship
itself could effectively handle suits, one party to which was in some
foreign nation beyond reach of the ordinary courts. The enforce-
ment of international law and rights of foreigners were, until the
last century, regarded as outside the purview of the ordinary courts
but rather within that of the admiral, chancellor or special officers,
.and more especially, as a branch of the maritime law, under the jur-
isdiction of the Admiralty. 3
In short, the common law ceded to Admiralty a separate and spe-
cial jurisdiction over maritime affairs, not because of any inherent
jurisdictional distinction between land and water, or any essential
difference in the transactions occurring on one or the other, but
solely because the international or extra-territorial character of the
-sea necessitated procedure and methods which the ordinary courts
did not possess. If, then, the origin and extent of separate mari-
time jurisdiction arose out of the international commonage of the
seas, and not Trom a difference in natural laws applicable, it is
illogical to suppose that its grant to the Federal government was
intended to cover navigable water merely as such. The expression
"'admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" had no such meaning and the
grant conveyed only its then understood application, with reason-
able and logical extension.
Our own courts, in referring to the origin of admiralty courts ot
reasons for their existence, have spoken in such tenor only. Thus
Justice WOODBmRY, dissenting, in Waring v. Clarke,'4 says,
"This last circumstance furnished another reason why the
admiralty court was allowed there, and should be here, to
continue to exercise some jurisdiction, beside their military
=Holdsworth's Hist. of English Law, 11, 26o.
" Id, 393.
14 5 How. 44r, 47r (1847).
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and naval power, over the conduct of seamen and the busi-
ness of navigation when foreign. Because such matters were
connected with the ocean, with foreign intercourse, foreign
laws and foreign people, and it was desirable to have the
law as to them uniform, and administered by those possessing
some practical acquaintance with such subjects; they being,
in short, matters extra-territorial, international, and pecu-
liar in some degree to the great highway of nations. It is
when thus confined to the great highway and its concerns,
that admiralty law deserves the just tribute sometimes paid
to it of expansive wisdom and elevated equity. Then only
there is an excellence in such regulations as to navigation
over those for rights and duties on land; the last being often
more ,for a single people, and their limited territory, while
the former are on most matters more expanded, more liberal;
'the gathered wisdom of and for all maritime ages and na-
tions." * * * "The sea being common to all nations, its po-
lice and the rights and duties on it should be governed
mainly by one code, known to all, and worthy to be respected
and enforced by all." /
In Chisholm v. Georgialu the court says, in reference to the gen-
eral judicial power of the United States as established by the Cbn-
stitution, that it extends, "5th, to all cases of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction; because, as the seas are the joint property of na-
tions, whose right and privilege relative thereto, are regulated by
the law of nations and treaties, such cases necessarily belong to
national jurisdiction." In Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia,'0 Justice
MCI,1,.AN says, "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is essen-
tially a commercial power, and it is necessarily limited to the exer-
cise of that power by Congress. Every voyage of a vessel between
two or more states is subject to the admiralty jurisdiction, and not
to any state regulation." Again, "A Court of Admiralty is a court
of the law of nations." * * * "The grant to the judicial department
of the cognizance of all causes of maritime jurisdiction, makes the
judicial co-extensive with the legislative power. This is the only
way in which we could be assured of having, what is so important
to a commercial nation, a uniform maritime law, in all the states of
the Union.' '17
Congress has never attempted to extend the jurisdiction to any-
1.2Dall. 419, 474 (x793).
162o HoW. 296, 304 (z85).
17The Huntress, 2 Ware 89, xo6, soS; Fed. Cas. 69X4 (1840).
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thing except interstate waters, having legislated only as to "naviga-
ble waters of the United States." Only those waters "constitute
navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the
Acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of
the states, when they form in their ordinary condition by them-
selves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over
which commerce is or may be carried on with other states or for-
eign countries in the customary modes by which such commerce is
conducted by water."' 8
To such waters, considering the states as separate judicial pow-
ers, all the reasons which created and enlarged the admiralty juris-
diction do apply as fitly as they originally did to the tidal waters.
But when the waters are such that every transaction upon them
must be begun and ended within the jurisdiction of a single judicial
power, and the instruments of commerce upon them must at all
times remain within the bounds of that power, those reasons do,
not apply, however appropriate the substantive law of the admiralty,
separated from the jurisdiction, might be, and the same courts that
administer the law of commerce and transactions upon the land
can, and alone ought to, have jurisdiction of the water.
JoHN BARKER WAITE.
UNIVSITY 0? MICHIGAN.
Is The Daniel Ball, to Wall. 557, 563 (1870); U. S. v. Burlington, etc. Ferry Co.,
ax Fed. 331 (1884).
